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Explaining Weseriibtmg 
Today, the oil leaking from the wreckage 
of the German Heavy Cruiser "Blucher" at 
Drobak is still a reminder of the German as-
sault on Norway in April 1940. This assault 
on Norway and on Denmark, Oper,ltion 
W!eseriilumg as it was generally called, arous-
ed the feelings of many members of the for-
mer German navy, the Kriegsmarine as it had 
been called in the Nazi-era, right after the 
end of World War II and for several decades 
to come. Why? In the Nuremberg trials, 
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, commander-
in-chief of the Kriegsmarine until 1943, was 
sentenced to life imprisonment, for he was 
held responsible for the preparation of this 
act of aggression. Of course, Raeder and his 
fellow-officers never accepted the charges 
against themselves and the Kriegsmarine. In 
their eyes, they had been nothing but soldiers, 
who had done their duty just as the members 
of Allied forces had done theirs. Accordingly, 
both during Raeder's imprisonment in the al-
lied prison for war criminals at Spandau and 
after his premature release in 1955 due to 
his steadily worsening health, the verdict of 
Nuremberg was decried as unjust whenever 
and wherever possible.' In 1956, the "ques-
tion of the Grand Admirals" even caused a 
fierce debate in parliament. At a public ce-
The editor's prefacl~ in the firsr volume of rhe legcndarv 
milira.ry journal !rlarinenmdsch.m, \'01. 50 (1953): 1. -
remony. at W:ilhelmshaven celebrating the 
foundanon ot the new Bundesmarine a 
high-ranking naval officer, Captain Zenl~er, 
rook the opportunity and severely criticised 
the Nuremberg-verdict.' Both admirals, he 
argued, had not only done their duty towards 
the German people but had kept ~he navv's 
"shield immaculate" before and during Wo;ld 
War II. Though Zenker was harshly criticised 
for his political speech by the opposition in 
the Bundestag, for he had tried to denv the 
active role of the former leadership of the 
Kriegs~uarine in the Nazi wars of aggression, 
the spmt of Zenker's speech dominated the 
debate on the role of the German navv and 
its commanders-in-chief during World War 
II for at leastanother decade, in some ways 
probably until Di)nitz's death in December 
1980. 
Whereas it seems at least partly under-
standable, which does not mean that it was 
acceptable, that members of the former 
I<riegsmarine as well as many others who 
had been directly or indirectly involved in 
the planning of the assaults on Denmark and 
Norway in 1940 had greatdifficulriesincoping 
With the Nuremberg trial, it is more difficult 
to understand and to accept what naval histo-
rians wrote about \\leseriibung after the war. 
The most important book on W'eseriilwng in 
2 j6rg Duppler, G~rn~<lm~-I aul dem A·lcen~. Bilder 
rmd Dokwmwtc :.ur deutschcn Alarillt'gcsclncht~ 
(Hamburg: ,\·littler, 1998), pp. 25-18. 
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the first ten-fifteen years after the war was 
probably written by Walther Hubatsch, a 
former officer in the German army, then 
Germany's most influential naval historian 
for almost three decades, first published in 
1952, and, as a revised and extended edition, 
in 1960,1 By quoting Winston S, Churchill's 
statement: "The two Admiralties thought 
with precision along the same lines in correct 
strategy" on his frontispiece, Hubatsch sug-
gested an interpretation, which was not only 
meant to pour oil onto the water, but to jus-
tify the decision of Grand Admiral Raeder, 
who was still alive then, and of the members 
of the Seekriegsleittt~zg in late 1939, early 
1940 to demand and to plan the occupation 
of neutral Denmark and Norway, Though 
Hubatsch gave a detailed description of both 
the planning and the execution of Weser-
iibzmg, the first combined operation of the 
German armed forces, he considered \\'leser-
iibzmg mainly as a pre-emptive strike, per-
haps even as a kind of self-defence justified 
by international law against British plans to 
occupy Norwegian territory . ..J "However 1', 
Hubatsch also admitted without going into 
detail, "these considerations, which were ba-
sed on conclusions erroneously drawn from 
the navy's experiences during World War 
I, were also interrelated with the wish to 
enlarge Germany's strategic position in a na-
val war. "S 
Of course, Hubatsch's interpretation was 
fully compatible with a far-reaching consen-
sus in Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, It was 
an integral part of a policy which attempted 
to end the debate on Germany's war-guilt, 
even if this meant ignoring outrageous acts 
of aggression and annihilation, 
In the context of this climate it was hard-
ly astonishing that the publication of two 
books written by a young Swedish scholar, 
Carl Axel Gemzell, in the mid-1960s and 
earlv 1970s caused an outcry among German 
nav;l historians, Gemzell was the first after 
Herbert Rosinski, a German naval historian 
3 
" 5 
\XIa\rhcr 1-lubatsch,, \Veseriilmng'', Die deutsche 
Beset-:;wzg 1'011 DiiuemJrk wul NorWCJ;I!II 19-10, 2nd 
revised edition \(i6ningcn: .\tusrerschmidt, 1 960). 
Ibid., p. 223. 
Ihid. 
who had been driven into exile on the eve 
of war, to link Weseriibung with the ideas of 
former German Admiral Wolfgang Wegener, 
Gemzell challenged widely accepted interpre-
tations by trying to prove that the roots of 
\Veseriilnmg were to be sought in important 
debates on German naval strategy and that 
the genesis of the idea of a base acquisition 
in Norway could be connected with conflicts 
in the navy, "In the spring of 1940," he con-
cluded, "this idea finally engaged the high-
est decision-makers," This attempt both at 
drawing a line of continuity in German na-
val thinking and naval planning between the 
two world wars and, moreover, again high-
lighting traditionally bitter conflicts within 
the navy's leadership was regarded as a pro-
vocation, Against the background of the 
Fischer debate on Germany's responsibility 
for the outbreak of World War I and the ex-
pansionist programme pursued by the leader-
ship of Imperial Germany, as well as the fact 
that the navy had always taken great pains to 
silence all internal critics in order to appear 
as a united, homogenous force, this was in 
fact too much, 
Eventually, it was Captain Karl Bid-
lingmaier, the naval historian at the newly 
est a b I i shed M iii tiirgesch ich tli ches Forsch zm gs-
amt at Freiburg, who harshly attacked Gem-
ze!L" Bidlingmaier, who had been stationed 
in Norway during the war as naval officer on 
board the battleship "Tirpitz", first contacted 
all naval decision-makers, who were still alive, 
In a detailed review, titled "Raeder's Guilt", 
a title which was omitted when the review 
was eventually published in the widely read 
journal Marinerlllldschall, Bidlingmaier, first, 
accused Gemzell of more or less complete ig-
norance of naval affairs,' Moreover, be repu-
diated Gemzell's attempts at est<Jblishing a 
line of continuity between Wegener's ideas 
and Raeder's decision, and, fin<~lly, again 
6 Bidlingsmaier correspondence in the Hundesnrchi\'~ 
!v1ilitiirarchiv (henceforth abbrevi:tted BA~J\IA) 
7 
RM 6/91: Cui-Alexander Gcmzdl, Raeder, Hitlr.!r 
zmd Skandinm>ien. Da Kampf {tir eillcnmaritimcll 
Opcmtwusplmz (Lund: Glccrup, 1965) and by the 
same author: Organi:::..ttion, Conflict, ,md lmuwation. 
A Stttd)' ol G~:mz.ln i\l,l/'111 Strategic PI.uming 1888-
I9..J-0 (Lund: Essdrc ~rudium, ]973). 
BA-MA RM 6191. 
emphasized the purely preventive nature of 
\Y!eserii/nmg by referring to selected state-
ments by Churchill about the feasibility of a 
British occupation of Norway. 
This attack on Gemzell was, however, in 
some respect nothing but the rem·guard ac-
tion of the former naval elite and its histori-
ans.' Detailed research has proved that the 
occupation of Denmark and Norway was a 
pure net of aggression and not a pre-etnptive 
action. All attempts to turn back the wheel 
in order to minimize Germany's historical 
responsibility for what happened between 
1940 and 1945 in Scandinavia have proved 
futile ever since. This does, however, not 
mean that the debate over continuities and 
discontinuities in naval thinking and naval 
planning has come to a standstill in the mean-
time. This problem is, as we shall see, more 
complex than one might expect at first sight. 
"The Scandinavian Problem" 
Germany's interest in parts of Scandinavia 
in general and in Norway in particular as a 
forward operating base for its fleet has roots 
which reach far back into the early twentieth 
century. The German Emperor, Wilhelm II, 
not only liked to draw historical analogies but 
was also influenced deeply by racial ideas. His 
infamous speeches about the "yellow peril" 
endangering the future of the Germanic race 
as well as about the inevitable conflict between 
Germans and Slavs are proverbial illustra-
tions of his weltanschauung, even though one 
may dispute their political relevance. Similar-
ly, his almost nostalgic summer cruises in 
Norwegian Fjords, where he felt somewhat 
at home, his attempts at resuscitating old Ger-
manic habits and traditions or at drawing 
8 On the navy's attempts to restore Irs rcpur.ninn in 
rhc 1 Y50s and 1960s sec Michael Epkenhans, ., 'Cllo' 
und die ~-Iarine_ .. , in Dwtsche Murineu im wrmzdel. 
Vom Svmbolnation.tlcr Einheit :um lnstmm!!nl 
iutcrn.;tHmaler Sicherheit, ed. Werner Rahn Uvlunich: 
O!d,·nbourg, 2005), pp. 363-396, and .JOrg Hillmann. 
,Die Kricgsmarinc und lhre Grol;admirale. Die 
Halrharkeit von Bildern der K.riegsmarine", in 
Alilit:irisch<! Erinngemngslwftur. So!d.Jfl!ll im Sj1icgc!l 
FOil Hiogr11pbien, Mcmoiren und Sclbstuugllissl!l!, 
eds. klichae! Epkcnhans. Srig F6rster .md Karen 
H;1gemann (Paderbnrn: Schi.lningh Padt:rborn. 2006), 
pp. 291-315. 
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somewhat strange lines between the past and 
the present are well known examples of his 
conviction that great events in the past were 
models for the future. Accordingly, in 1889, 
for example, he gave Otto von Bismarck, Ger-
many's "Iron Chancellor", the drawing of a 
Viking ship, thus trying to remind him of a 
Germanic naval tradition dating back into 
medieval times." 
However, the Emperor as well as the mili-
tary and, eventually, also the naval leadership 
were always fully aware of the "Scandinavian 
problem" as one might call it. Since the war 
against Denmark in 1864, Germany had an 
open flank in the north, and though it was un-
likely that Denmark alone would trv ro take 
revenge for its defeat and the Ger~1an con-
quest of Danish territory, Germany's leader-
ship always took into account that Denmark 
might join its enemies by opening its ports to 
an allied landing force or allowing them to 
close the Danish narrows. Though German 
military thinking was dominated by the sce-
nario of a two-front-war against France and 
Russia, time and again, the general staff 
developed plans to occupy Denmark. Simi-
larly, at rhe turn of the century, the navy 
became interested in Danish affairs, too. 
The embarkation on world policy and the 
challenge to Britain's world and naval sup-
remacy meant that an Anglo-German naval 
war was likely in the future. As long as rhe 
German navy was still too weak to openly 
challenge the Royal Navy, it was, however, 
important to decide where to strike. In all 
German plans for a naval war until the eve 
of wm; the Danish narrows and the Kattegar 
played an important role accordingly.w For, 
9 See the original in Ono-nm-Bismarck-Sciftung, 
fricdrichsruh, Bismarck jhl{JI!rs, B 130. On the 
mythic role of Scandina\'ia in Gcrmanv at rhe rum 
o{ the century see the catalogue of the .exhhihirion 
presented in Sweden, Norway, and Gcrm.my in 
!998: "Skandinavicn och Tyskbnd. 1800-1914'', cd. 
Dcur:;che Historischc lvluseum (Berlin, 1998). In Oslo 
this exhibition was presented by Norsk Folkemuseum 
(the Norwegian Museum nf Cultural History). A copy 
of the dmwing of the emperor can be found on page 
!10. 
I 0 See lvo N. Lunhi, The N.1l'\' illld Germ,m Power 
l'olitics, 1862-]9]4 (LondOn: Allen & Unwin, 
1984), pp.l 91-240, 332-360, 390...o.l 15. See .1lso 
.i\-1ichacl Salcwskl,, 'Wcscr(ibunp; 1905'? Diinemark 
im srr:ncgisdwn 1\alkii! Deutschlands ,·or dcm Ersten 
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dominating these narrows would nor only 
mean that the German Navy would be able 
to preserve its naval supremacy in the Baltic, 
but that it might also be able to plan and 
conduct successful sorties against a superior 
force in the North Sea. 
Military and naval planning for a war 
which somehow included Scandinavia, suf-
fered from one decisive weakness. Even 
in the great European crisis of 1905, the 
army was unwilling and in fact unable to 
spare enough troops for the occupation of 
Danish territory either to prevent a British 
landing or to improve the navy's strategic 
position. Accordingly, all plans of operation 
Weseriibuug, developed in 1905/06, proved 
futile in the event. The army's preoccupation 
with a two-front-war against France and 
Russia, however, did not mean that the prob-
lem of Scandinavian neutrality did not bother 
Germany's leadership anymore. In 1912, for 
example, when the German ambassador to 
Copenhagen reported that Danish officials 
had assured him that they wanted to be neutral 
in a future war berween the great powers, the 
Emperor bluntly remarked: "No, they have 
to go with us." 11 Germany's attitude towards 
Norway differed only in degree. All promises 
about preserving the neutrality of this young 
nation were not worth the paper on which 
they were written. The geographic position of 
both countries, Denmark and Norway, was 
too tempting from a military point of view, 
in order to be ignored in wartime. 1' Both 
governments were, of course, fully aware of 
the dangers emanating from the geographic 
position of their respective countries. The 
Norwegian Chief of the Department for Mi-
litary Operations, Captain L'Orange, for ex-
ample, was afraid that Germany might be 
tempted ro occupy Kristiansand or Bergen 
in order to establish a naval base there, "a 
Wdtkricg"', in Michud Salewski, Die Dcutsc!JenEmd 
die Sec. Stttdicn ::ur deutscbc11 Afarinegcscbicbte dc:s 
19. zmd 20.}•thrlumderts, eds . .Ji.irgcn Elvert and Srd.1n 
Lippert (Stuttgart: franz Steiner Verlag, 1998), pp. 
138-151. 
11 See the Emperor's remarks to the report by rht German 
;lmbassaclor ro Copenh<tgen, Count Brockdorff-
Ranrzau. 15.1.1912, in: BA-MA R~-15/1639. 
12 Hubarsch,, \1/r:sr:riilmng", pp.l-9. 
German Gibraltar" as he called itY Unfor-
tunately, however, both countries were too 
weak to defend rheir neutrality against any 
superior power. 
The outbreak of World War I completely 
changed the situation. Eventually all Scandi-
navian countries were able to preserve their 
neutrality. However, time and again, the Bri-
tish and the German military leaderships 
toyed with the idea of occupying parts of 
Denmark and, perhaps, even Norway in order 
to improve their strategic position. Since 1916 
plans for the execution of the so-called cases 
"J" for Denmark and "N" for Norway lay in 
the drawers of both the General Staff and the 
Admiral staff." Norway, especially, began to 
occupy the minds of German naval planners, 
for they had begun to realize fully that the 
latter's position might be very advantageous 
in a naval war. Why? 
Nlore than anything else, the course of 
World War I at sea soon high! ighted the stra-
tegic dilemma of both German warfare in 
general as well as naval warfare against a 
superior naval power, Great Britain, in par-
ticular. Generally speaking, Germany proved 
much more vulnerable to the Allied blockade 
than most planners in polirical, military, and 
naval circles had expected before the war. The 
short German North Sea coastline containing 
the main naval bases of Wilhelmshaven and 
Cuxhaven was defensively very strong: scre-
ened by a string of small offshore islands, its 
estuaries protected by sandbanks, and with 
a formidable outlying fortress, the island of 
Heligoland. The Baltic was almost as impreg-
nable, its narrow entrance channels between 
the Danish islands an obvious lair for subma-
rines and destroyers lying in wait for any ship 
trying to break through the Danish narrows. 
Moreover, the canal between the Baltic and 
the North Sea made possible the rapid move-
ment between both areas of operation. 
However, though the German Navy was 
strong as long as it was on the defensive, it 
was decisively weak in case it had to or wan-
13 Sec the report by the German ambassador to 
Copenhagen, Count Brot:kdorff~Rantznu, 23 . .2.1913, 
in: BA-MA RM 5/1639. 
14 Set· the documents in BA-i\IA R.M 5/904, 905,906 and 
RM 4~48-4950. 
ted to take the offensive. The bulk of the Bri-
tish landmass to the west was something of 
a vast breakwater. Moreover, the Norwegian 
peninsula to the north made it very difficult 
to reach the open Atlantic without being 
detected by superior British forces. All the 
Grand Fleet had to do was to establish a bar-
rier between the Orkney Islands and the Nor-
wegian coast both to prevent German surface 
raiders from escaping into the open seas and 
to cur off Germany from her lifeline of vital 
imports. 
This was, however, a scenario which 
German naval planners had not foreseen, 
when they began challenging Britain and the 
world by embarking on an ambitious pro-
gramme of naval expansion at the turn of the 
century. They still expected a battle following 
traditional patterns of naval warfare, just as 
Alfred Thayer lvlahan, the modern prophet 
of both naval building and naval strategy 
bad described it in his breathtaking books on 
the "Influence of sea-power upon History". 
This meant that the High Seas Fleer expected 
the Grand Fleet to establish a close blockade 
of the German Bight and that its attempts 
at breaking this blockade would result in a 
battle under the guns of Heligoland. 15 
However, this strategy with its many advan-
tages for a navy which had to strike from a 
defensive position like the German High Seas 
Fleet soon proved wishful thinking. Why? 
Of course, many high-ranking British naval 
officers, influenced by !\'laban's writings as 
well as the myth of the battle of Trafalgar, 
also regarded a battle right after the outbreak 
of a war against Germany as an aim in itself. 
But the development of new weapons such as 
the torpedo, the mine, and the submarine as 
well as the incredible costs of modern battle-
ships and battle-cruisers made it seem too ris-
ky to pursue a strategy which might prove 
too costly, if not even fatal in fact. 
On the eve of war, the British Admiralty 
had therefore eventually decided to change its 
strategy in a war against Germany. Following 
15 On German and British phtnnlng for a naval war 
see Eva Bcstcck, Die triigaiscbc "First Li1w of 
De(£•1tce". Zum deutsch-britischcn W'eun·istcn t•or 
dcm F.rsu.•n W'dtkricg (Frciburg: Rombach Druck- und 
Ver!agshaus, 2006 ). 
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Corbett's theory that sea-power meant domi-
nating the lines of communication, the Grand 
Fleet would simplv cut Germanv's lifelines bv 
establishing a wicle blockade at the entranc~ 
of the North Sea. If the German High Seas 
Fleet tried to break this blockade, it would 
have to seek battle under unfavourable 
circumstances - namely far away from its 
main bases and - depending upon the dis-
tance- perhaps even without the important 
support from its torpedo-boats. 
25 years later, in February 1938, Vice-
Admiral Kurt Assmann, the director of the 
German naval archives, was right when he 
chamcterized this development as a complete 
reversal of Tirpitz's idea of building a "risk 
fleet". 16 Whereas the Secretarv of State had 
intended to put pressure upon Britain by buil-
ding a powerful tleet which would be roo 
great a risk to attack, the Admiralty, under 
Churchill's leadership, had, in 1911/1912, 
drawn a conclusion from this development 
which more or less turned Tirpitz's political 
and naval strategy upside down. "If Britain 
could hope that it could wear down Germany 
in a future war without using its fleet, there 
would not be any risk anymore. Due to this 
far-reaching decision, the Atlantic Ocean, or 
at least the entrance into the Atlantic Ocean 
would be the decisive theatre of the naval 
war, not the wet triangle in the North Sea as 
we had expected so far." 17 
In the course of his lecture, Assmann paint-
ed an interesting picture of German naval 
strategy before and during World War I; he 
highlighted Tirpitz's idee fixe of a decisive 
battle which left no room for alternative stra-
tegies, the complete lack of cooperation be-
tween the political, the military, and the naval 
leadership, and the "wrong understanding of 
the classical teachings of the history of naval 
warftlre due to an insufficient understanding 
16 Kurt Assmann,,.,Gedankcn iiber die Probleme dcr 
dcmschen SeekrlcgfGhrung im Weltkricgc", Fcbruarr 
1938, in BA~i\tA Rfv1 8/1121. Sl·c also Gemzcll, 
Organi::>ItiOil, pp. 361-362, and Rolf Hobson, 
lm{l!!rii1lism at Se.1. N,w,lf Str.Jtegic Thought, the 
ldt!olog)' o(S.;J Power ,md tbt' Tirpitz P/Jit, 1875-
19 I 4 (Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002), pp. 
163.26, who rightly emph,1size the imwmance of 
Assmann 's ideas. 
17 A:-,smann. ,Gedanken ... ". 
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of its real principles" as he called it. How-
ever, he also pointed out the disadvantages 
of geography. In peacetime, Assmann argued, 
Germany's political leadership should have 
improved Germany's geographic position 
bv concluding some kind of agreement 
\~ith Denmark, an agreement which would 
even have jnstified a number of sacrifices. 
"'Denmark", Assmann admitted, ''vvould 
not have opened the door into the open 
Atlantic, but, apart from the key inro Baltic, 
we would ar least have possessed two sortie 
routes into the northern North Sea instead 
of onlv one. Moreover, a strong naval base 
at Skagen would have been of an enormous 
value in our fight for the door into the At-
lantic Ocean." Perhaps, Assmann argued, 
Norway could also have been won over by 
such a~ alliance policy, and during the war, 
an occupation of both countries might have 
extended Germany's strategic position in the 
Northern Atlantic. 
Indirectly, and this is important to stress, 
Assmann referred to ideas which had been 
developed by a young naval officer during 
the war, but which had been regarded as a 
kind of heresy by many of his superiors: the 
ideas of commander Wolfgang Wegener. 18 In 
several memoranda Wegener had analyzed 
Germany's naval strategy and, moreover, 
Tirpitz's concept of the importance of a de-
cisive battle as the prerequisite of naval sup-
remaC\'. As earlv as 1915, he had accused 
Tirpit~ of buildi~g a fleet "without taking into 
account Gern1any's geographical position." 
Accordingly, he suggested the occupation of 
a "position in the Skagerrak"- as he called it 
-including the Fa roes as well as of two ports 
on the French Atlantic coast. Thus he wanted 
to get hold of the "handle of the door" into the 
Atlantic Ocean which meant the occupation 
of real naval bases, not cruiser bases. 
During World War I Wegener's ideas had 
been unwelcome, for they had conflicted with 
more traditional concepts of naval warfare. 
i'V!oreover, a strategy of sea-denial, which 
meant unrestricted submarine-warfare, had 
seemed to promise to be more successful in 
I R A collection of his memomnda can be found in his 
priv:trc papers in HA-I\-lA \Vegcncr papers N 60711-2. 
the naval war against Britain than a difficult 
and dangerous assault on Scandinavian count-
ries in order to enlarge Gern1any~s strategic 
position. In this context it should also be ad-
ded that the army had been unable to provide 
any troops for such an operation -even after 
the victory against Roumania in late 1916 
- not to speak of the inherent problems of a 
large-scale combined operation. 
Wegener's Heretical Ideas 
After 1918, there was neither an army nor a 
navv which were able to conduct anv offensive 
ope~ations at all. This, however,' does not 
mean that their respective leaderships did not 
cherish the idea of grasping for world power 
again. More urgent needs, especially the need 
to develop a strategy against Poland and 
France, Germany's most likely adversaries in 
a war in the near future, with only a limited 
number of outdated vessels required the full 
attention of all members of a rather small 
navy. Moreover, as long as Germany was 
governed by democratic parties, there was no 
room for any aggressive policy. 
Nevertheless, even in the interwar period 
German naval planners were very alive to the 
weaknesses described above. In spite of Tirpitz's 
shadow, which still loomed large over the navy, 
its officers, not to speak of its historians, dis-
cussed possible strategic scenarios and military 
options. Wolfgang Wegener, the most important 
war-time naval heretic, who had been promoted 
to the post of Inspector of the Marine Artillery 
and appointed Rear Admiral in 1923, again 
took the oppommiry to propagate his ideas by 
circulating an unpublished and revised version of 
the memoranda he had written between 1915 and 
1917. 19 
His Denkschrift included three main 
points: 
• Naval strategy during and before World 
19 \Volfgang \\'cgencr, Die Scestr.Jtegie des W'e!tkriegcs 
(Berlin: E. S. ~ titder & Sohn, 1929), and, ag,tin, nt)\\1 
unabridged, in 1941. Wegener's book was transbred 
by Holger H. Herwig and published by Naval Institute 
Press: \Xrolfgang Wegener, Tbe Nau.zl Stmtegy of tht! 
\\'orld \\1,lr (Annapolis: Nantllnstitutc Press, 1989). 
Sec especially Gemzcll, Raeder ... , pp. 15-25; and by 
the same aurhor Orgcmhation ... , pp. 266-271. 
War I had concentrated too much on the 
defensive. 
• Germany's coastal base must be extend-
ed. 
• The new navy must be created on the 
basis of offensive measures and as a re-
sult of long-term planning. 
In this context he particularly pointed out that 
the realisation of this strategic objective must 
not be halted by any considerations of neutralitY. 
Though Wegener was nor very precise in tl;e 
published version of his memoranda, which, of 
course, had been censored by the Marineleitung 
before, it was clear that Denmark and Norwav 
were his main objectives. Especially the 1 000 mil~ 
long Norwegian coastline, facing tl1e Atlantic 
Ocean and opening up the se,ls of the world had 
generated his vision of a naval strategy that had 
been out of reach in the earlier conllict. Protected 
by the off-shore islands, German submarines 
could slip in and our of Norwegian ports with 
impunity and surface raiders could return to re-
fuel and rearm without having to brave the 
submarine blockade of the North German 
ports. 
However, in 1929, such ideas were not wel-
come. Raeder, the chief of the Marineleitung, 
was outraged by this pamphlet. At first sight, this 
reaction seemed fully understandable, because 
Raeder was one ofTirpitz's most faithful disciples. 
By publishing his Denkschrift, however, Wegener 
had again severely criticised the "master" of the 
Gem1an navy. A closer look shows, however, 
that Raeder's reaction was probably motivated 
by his desire to destroy the impression that the 
navy was once again secretly making plans for 
another grasp for world power. Onlv the vear 
before, in 1928, the Marineleitung had had great 
difficulties in pushing through its demands for a 
new armoured cruiser. While this demand was 
motivated by the need to build a vessel which 
was strong enough to defend German rerritorv 
against Polish claims, it was clear for even' in·-
sider that the Panzerkreuzer, due to its r~nge, 
armour, and armament was basicallv a vessel for 
cruiser warfare in the Atlantic and not off the 
coast of East Prussia. In tl1is context Wegener's 
Denkschrift could prove highly detrimental to 
Raeder's ultimate aims. Nevertheless, \1(/egener's 
book as well as the memoranda written by two 
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nava.l officers, who later became high-ranking 
admtrals, Forste and Weichold, in 1929 on the 
"History of case .J and its lessons for a ndval war 
in the future" clearly illustrate that the German 
naval leadership dealt seriously with German stra-
tegy towards neutral Scandinavian countries in a 
future war.20 
Hitler's rise to power in January 1933, 
however, completely changed the foundations of 
both Gennan foreign policy and naval planning 
as well as naval butldmg. Though the navv had 
to restrain itself as well as avoid any conllic; with 
Great Britain for the time being, it was clear that 
Raeder regarded this change in German domestic 
and foreign policy as a golden oppommitv. "The 
scale of world importance of a nation corr~sponds 
Wtth the scale of tts maritime power", he told 
Hitler in 1934.21 These could have been Tirpitz's 
words, and it is clear what was meant. In the 
long run, the navy was willing to fight for naval 
supremacy once gain. 
However, for the time being, Raeder knew 
that it would be suicidal to begin a new race 
against Grear Britain. For such a race, he ne-
eded rime, and he was quite satisfied when 
Britain and Germany concluded a naval 
agreement in 1935. Whereas Raeder and the 
Kriegsmarine needed rime for obvious rea-
sons, Hirler increasingly felt that he had no 
time, especially no time to wait until Great 
Britain would come, as he -like Tirpitz- said 
time and again. After 1937 Anglo-German re-
lations quickly deteriorated. What did this 
mean for naval planning? 
As early as 1937, when the Anglo-German 
~greement seemed to grant some kind of respite 
111 whtch the fleet could slowly be built up, Raeder 
had given a detailed account of his ideas on na-
val power in general and naval strategy in particu-
lar 111 the presence of high-ranking political and 
military leaders, including Hitler himself, on 3 
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a naval power based on a strong fleet and on a 
prominent geographical position. He also deman-
ded a long-term shipbuilding programme. More-
over, he referred to the experiences of World War 
I and gave a detailed interpretation of them. He 
criticized German naval warfare during World 
War I, especially the concentration on one decisive 
battle. Instead, he argued , in a future war it would 
be necessary to seek the decision not only in one 
big operation but in numerous operations within 
an offensive framework. Though Raeder proved 
a true disciple ofTirpitz in many ways in this long 
speech, there can be no doubt that he had also 
taken up some of \XIegener's ideas, for example 
when he referred to the latter's demand for base 
expansion. 
\XIhile it was unnecessary to draw immediate 
consequences in early 1937, the political and, 
thus also the militarv, situation changed within 
months. Sooner tha~ expected the navy had to 
draw up war plans against the Royal Navy. In 
a speech in which he commented on the navy's 
war games in the winter of 1937/38, Raeder 
rook the opportunity of making a more general 
statement in the presence of the members of the 
Seekriegsleitwzg. He declared that every analysis 
of the war games must come to the demand for 
a change in Germany's initial strategic position. 
Thus it was obvious that naval warfare against 
Russia would be greatly facilitated if a base was 
available oo the Aland Islands in the Baltic. "From 
the same line of thought", he continued, "one can 
follow the ideas of Admiral Wegener, and for the 
carrying out of naval warfare demand first of 
all the occupation of Denmark and Norway. "23 
It is true that in the course of his speech Raeder 
warned against wishful thinking and against de-
mands that, "even if they corresponded to the 
needs of naval warfare, were not adapted to the 
total political and military siruation." 
Ottrncr, ,'\\'eseri.ibung'. Der deutsche Angriff auf 
Diim:mark und Norwegt·n im April I 940'' (1\-iunich: 
O!dcnbourg, 1994 ), rightly cmphasiz,cs the importance 
of Raeder's speech as well .1s the .::oncurrence of 
Wege1wr's and Raeder's ideas. See, however, !vlichad 
Salewski, ,Das \Xlesentliche von 'Weserlihung'", in 
Mic/Jad Saf,:wski, Die Deutscbenzmd die See. Studicn 
zur dcutschen 1\.'larincgeschichte dt~S 19. tmd 20. 
].1hrlmndats, eds. Ji.irgcn Elvert and Stefan Lippert 
(Snmgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998), pp. 264-265, 
who- unjustly- denies that R;tcdcr was directly or 
indirectly intlucnced by \'i/egcner. 
23 Cited in Gemzdl, R;wder ... , p. 281. 
What is important here is the fact that, as 
Gemzell has already rightly argued, "the war 
game and Raeder's speech show that there was a 
strong demand from within the navy for a large-
scale base expansion. "24 The so-called "Planning 
Committee", established in 19 3 8 to outline the 
strategy against Great Britain, also dealt with this 
question of base expansion, E venrually it came ro 
the conclusion that any expansion would have 
only tactical but no strategic advantages as long 
as Britain was able to control tl1e line between 
Scotland, the Shetlands and Bergen. New war 
games also discussed the idea of occupying Den-
mark and Norway. However, without a powerful 
fleet, which needed years to build, all planning 
seemed somewhat useless as long as this fleet ex-
isted only on paper and as long as the army and 
the air force were nor involved in this strategic 
expansion programme. 
A Pre-emptive Strike? 
The time to expand Germany's continental basis, 
however, arrived sooner than expected by the 
navy. According to Raeder's well-known state-
ment of 3 September 1939, all the Kriegsmarine 
could do in this untimely war due to its limited 
stren~o>th was ro fight bravely and to show that it 
could die honestly.'" Accordingly, German raiders 
and submarines conducted cruiser warfare in the 
Atlantic, but they were unable to achieve strate-
gic aims. All the navy could do was to intensify 
submarine warfare. It was in this context that 
Rader first mentioned the acquisition of a base in 
Norway or in l\l[urmansk. A week late1; during 
an internal meeting, this question was discussed 
again. '"It is necessary", Raeder told his officers, "to 
examine the question, if there was a possibility of 
acquiring a base in Norway through Russian and 
German pressure in order to principally improve 
our strategic and operational position. ,,26 
At first sight, this argument seemed understan-
dable. Why? "As early as the beginning of 
October, 1939, intelligence reached the Na-
val Staff that plans were being considered in 
England to operate against Norway", Vice-
24 Ibid. 
15 Sec iv1ichad Salcwski, Die dcutschc Sr:ekrh~gslcittmg 
l93S-19-15, mi. l (Frankfurr am .\V1.tin: Bernard & 
Graefe, 1970-75), p. 91. 
16 Cired In Otuncr, , \'i/cseriilnmg" .... p. 10. 
Admiral Assmann wrote in 1957.'7 This was 
nothing but a reiteration of a statement he 
had made in a memorandum he had written 
almost ten years earlier for the Admiralty in 
London: "lr was absolutely essential ro pre-
vent England from occupying Norway; since 
this would have brought Sweden also under 
English int1uence, and would have seriously 
endangered German sea communications in 
the Baltic. It would have interrupted the sup-
ply of Swedish ore to Germany, and would 
have allowed England to intensify her air war 
on Germany. The maintenance of German 
naval supremacy in the Baltic and the con-
tinued supply of Swedish ore were both vital 
to Germany's conduct of the war. The Naval 
Staff considered that the loss of Norway to 
England would be synonymous with losing 
the war." 
J'vloreover; would a pre-emptive strike to ex-
tend Germany's naval bases, even if this meant rhe 
violation of the neutrality of Scandinavian states, 
not be a genuine lesson taught by history from a 
naval point of view? The AJJies had done so in 
1918 when they had forced rhe Norwegians to 
support rhe completion of a mine barrier con-
sisting of more than 70,000 mines between 
Scotland and Norway. Whilst this chain had 
not been as successful as had been hoped because 
some of the mines proved defective, there was 
no justification for believing that it would not 
be technically possible to complete a very formi-
dable barrier in a future war against Britain. 
There was also the iron ore. Whilst the iron 
ore carriers were secure within the protection 
of the territorial waters inside the Leads, at 
least as long as the Allies respected this legal 
restraint, they would become easy prey for sub-
marines and surface raiders if forced by mining 
into the open Norwegian sea. Other valuable 
imports also came into Germany from Sweden's 
industrial base, and Scandinavia was economic-
allv more important to Germany than to the 
Aliies. So even though a strict interpretation of 
neutrality by the Scandinavian countries might 
have suited the German interests, at least in the 
early phase of the war when their forces were 
stretched, the British interest lay in interfering 
with Norwegian neutrality to the detriment of 
27 Cited in Gcmzell, R,1t.'dt•r ... , p. 327. 
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German trade and long term naval strategy. We 
have seen of course that such thoughts were being 
voiced within the Admiralrv and elsewhere even 
before the war started. . 
Of even greater concern than a nominallv 
neutral Norway under the int1uence of Gre;t 
Britain would be one actually occupied by the 
Allies. If the RAF could operate from airfields 
in Norway and the Royal Navy from ports in 
the Skagerrak, the Baltic Sea would become a 
British lake and the inferior German Navv 
would be systematically destroyed. Furthe;-
more, British bombers would also dominate 
the industrial areas of northern Germany. A 
British occupied Norway would be a strategic 
disaster for Germany and must be avoided at 
all costs. The German Navy at least was well 
aware of this threat establishing a presence 
ashore to thwart the export of iron ore to Ger-
many. 
These arguments, did, of course play a role, 
bur it is astonishing that Raeder did nor even men-
tion them. It was Germany's strategic position 
that had to be improved, not Germany's iron ore 
trade that had to be protected against British at-
tacks. We all know what happened in the weeks 
and months which followed these deliberations 
about the feasabiliry or even the need of an attack 
on Norway. 2~ 
This leads us to the final question: why did 
Raeder not only plead for but, in fact, demand 
the planning and execution of Weseriibtmg? Four 
reasons, which are somewhat interrelated, may 
give an answer to this question:29 
1. Firstly and secondly, both from a tacti-
cal and from a strategic point of view, \Veser-
iibung seemed inevitable in a narrower as well 
as in a broader sense. Tactically, Norway was 
the only base from which the Kriegsmarine 
could successfully conduct operations 
against Britain, if it did not want to repeat 
the Kleinkrieg of World War I, which had ren-
dered no results. 
2. Thirdly, these tactical needs correspon-
ded with Raeder's conception that the navy, 
unlike 1914-18, should cur, if possible, Bri-
tain's lines of communication in rhe Atlan-
18 For a detailed ;tccmmt sec Ottmcr, , \V!.'scriibrmg", pp. 
31-132. 
29 Sec n!so Salcwski, ,.Das \X'cscndiche von 
'Wc.scriibung'", pp. 262-269. 
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tic. This aim, however, was directly and in· 
directly the result of the navy's historical 
experiences during World War I. Deeply in-
terested in naval history, Raeder was only 
too well aware of them and he had closely 
followed the debate on different strategies in 
the past. Even though we may never know 
to what extent Raeder was in fact influenced 
by Wegener's ideas, there can be no doubt 
that rhev had the function of a caralvst in 
preparin-g Weseriibung. As long as l~aeder 
had hoped that Britain might come, he had 
refused to even discuss them, always bearing 
in mind that such a discussion might be detri-
mental both to his political aims as well as 
to the unitv of the naval officer corps. In this 
respect, R~eder was a true disciple of Tirpitz: 
he was afraid of the consequences of an open 
debate about naval strategy which inevitably 
would have disastrous effects on both Grear 
Britain and neutral countries. In late 1939, 
these obstacles did not exist anymore. On the 
contrary, Raeder now began ro realize that 
the navv - firsrlv - needed a success which 
would s~rengthe,; its position within the pol i-
tical and military lhierrchv of the Third Reich 
- the historical c~nalogy t;J 1914-1918 lies at 
hand. 
Besides, he knew that base expansion 
would greatly enhance the navy's capabilities 
in rhe naval war against Great Bririan. At 
this time, only Norway and not the French 
Atlantic Coast as some naval planners 
thought was able to provide the key to the 
door into the Atlantic. However, though this 
conclusion seemed compelling, it did nor 
take into account one important aspect: such 
an operation might extend the navy's bases, 
but at the cost of its fleet, without which, 
as \Xlegener had argued, it was impossible 
to exert sea-power. Instead, the base would 
turn into a burden, which would be felt more 
heavily every dav. 
3. in a br;ade.r strategic sense, \Veseriibwzg 
seemed necessary in order to prepare the con-
tinental glacis for a future fight against the 
Soviet Union - that is probably one of the 
reasons why Hitler, who never fully under-
stood the navy's strategic problems, eventu-
ally approved Raeder's demands. 
4. \Veseriilnmg also neatly fitted in into 
the Nazi ideology of a Europe dominated be 
the "Germanic race". High ranking naval of-
ficers seem ro have shared this vision; the "con-
fessions" of Admiral Boehm are a striking 
example of the degree to which members of 
the Kriegsmarine shared the ideas of "Yolk, 
Ra urn und Rasse :~,. Jn 
Conclusion 
To sum up: From the navy's point of view, in 
spite of irs heavy losses during \Veseriibzmg, 
the wheel seemed to have come full circle in 
the summer of 1940. In the preface of the 
completely revised edition of the first volume 
of The \\'l,zr at Sea, 1914-1918,31 Admiral 
Assmann was proud to write that the hope 
expressed in the first edition which had been 
published in 1920 had come true: Germany 
was again a powerful state on the continent 
and it seemed to have the resources to defend 
its status whatever might happen in the fu-
ture. The navy, he proudly added, this rime 
had greatly contributed to this development. 
Only five years later, none of those who 
had been responsible at this time was willing 
to accept responsibility any more. Moreover, 
no one was willing to admit that the navy 
had pursued a policy, which not only once 
bur twice had contributed to the outbreak 
of a World War. It was only several decades 
later that a new generation of naval historians 
began to tell the real story of Weseriibwzg 
rhus paving the way for a better understandig 
of the past and helping to learn lessons which 
were to prove important for the future. 
30 See. Hoehm's memorandum on ,Die polirischc: 
Enrwicklung in Norwegen in dcr Zeit seir dcr 
Besetzung 1940 bis nun Frtihjahr 1943~, in: BA-£\-1A 
R~! 6/R9 
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